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Abstract 
As a response to forest conflict, contemporary remapping refers to re-evaluations of resource 
values, new and diverse forms of governance among stakeholders, and compromises within 
patterns of land use that give greater emphasis to environmental and cultural priorities. This 
paper elaborates the processes of remapping by examining the role of institutional innovation in 
conflict resolution, with particular reference to the iconic Great Bear Rainforest of British 
Columbia.  After years of conflict and protest, peace in the Great Bear Rainforest was heralded 
by an interim agreement in 2006, with final ratification likely in 2016. Conceptually, a four-
legged stakeholder model identifies the main institutional interests and their interactions through 
learning and bargaining. New forms of governance were created to bring the stakeholders 
together in constructive dialogue and then to reach and implement acceptable bargains. 
Analytically, the paper examines how this agreement has worked in practice by reflecting on the 
emergence of novel institutions that integrate the interests of key stakeholders. The discussion 
identifies six bilateral negotiations between: industrial and environmental interests; federal and 
provincial governments and aboriginal peoples; government and environmental interests; 
government and industry; industry and aboriginal peoples; and environmental groups and local 
communities. The remapping process has produced a thickening architecture of institutions that 
remain experimental even as they seek to promote sustainability, resilience and legitimacy. 
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1. Introduction 
If forest conflicts have a long history (Widick 2009), they have become a widespread 
feature of contemporary globalization. Broadly defined as disagreements and disputes regarding 
access and management of resources, incompatible activities that seek to restrict one another, and 
as clashes among diverse institutional interests over the control and use of resources (Gritten et al 
2012; Hayter et al 2003), forest conflicts feature a wide-ranging mix of actors and motivations. 
‘Wars in the woods’, a metaphor with sometimes literal connotations, are typically intense, long-
lasting and locally contingent. Yet a significant impulse driving forest conflicts around the world 
is opposition by diverse environmental, aboriginal, and related communities to the vested interests 
of forest commodification in favour of the non-industrial, sustainable values of forests, and the 
emergence of these stakeholders forces the remapping of the forest and its human relationships. 
As an umbrella term, remapping refers to two closely related processes in support of new 
forms of sustainable and equitable resource governance: the revaluations of resources from a 
commodity base to incorporate environmental and non-consumptive uses, and specific changes to 
land use designations that derive from these revaluations (Affolderbach et al 2012; see also 
Brogden and Greenberg (2003) on re-territorialization). Remapping serves as both normative 
metaphor for the conflicts and prescription for new regional plans and forms of governance that 
generate new institutions to address stakeholder interests in ways that replace conflict with 
cooperation. The contested creation of the Great Bear Rainforest on the central coast of British 
Columbia, Canada, provides an iconic case.  
The Great Bear Rainforest (GBR) stretches from Bute Inlet to the Alaskan border and is 6.4 million 
hectares in extent, comprising about one-quarter of the world’s remaining old growth coastal 
temperate rainforest, and a rich range of flora and fauna (Figure 1; McAllister et al 1997).  This 
large, remote, sparsely populated territory contains just over 22,000 people, half aboriginal 
belonging to 27 nations. With roots in BC’s ‘wars in the woods’ that flared in the early 1980s, the 
region became the focus of intense conflict that culminated in a 2004 stakeholder agreement 
(CCLRMP 2004) in which one-third of the region was protected, logging companies committed 
themselves to ecosystem-based management in the working forest, and commitments made to the 
development aspirations of indigenous peoples. This agreement was ratified in 2006 by 
government and aboriginal peoples (called ‘First Nations’ in Canada), and painstakingly elabora- 
ted during subsequent years; the final legislated agreement was announced on 1 Feb. 2016. 
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Figure 1: The Great Bear Rainforest 
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Although not without its critics, the GBR (2006) agreement has been widely applauded in 
the media and academic literature (Armstrong 2009; Dempsey 2011; Howlett et al 2009). Several 
studies scrutinizing the agreement have emphasized the innovativeness of remapping processes 
and outcomes.  Thus McGee et al (2010) explain the agreement’s shift towards ‘innovative 
collaborative planning’, including the Joint Solutions Project between business and environmental 
non-government organizations (ENGOs); Affolderbach (2011) focuses on the role of ENGOs in 
brokering the agreement; Price et al (2009) discuss the novel elements of the ecosystem-based 
management governing future logging; Low and Shaw (2011/12) highlight the new features of the 
agreement involving aboriginal peoples, notably government-to-government negotiations and the 
Coast Opportunity Funds; while Affolderbach et al (2012) draw attention to the creation of a 
scientific boundary organization, the Coast Information Team. The agreement featured 
fundamentally changed relations between environmental politics and science (Dempsey 2011), 
and is broadly influential, serving as model for the Boreal Forest Agreement of 2010 that covers 
76 million hectares across Canada (Boychuk 2011). 
This paper examines innovation, highlighted if not problematized in the studies cited above. 
Our study begins from Weiss’s (2011) observation that institutional innovations are especially 
important in forestry. Weiss (2011, 11) broadly classifies institutional innovations as new 
cooperative organizations, laws, policies, and procedures. In forest conflicts, such process 
innovations are designed to facilitate dialogue among stakeholders. If successful, they create and 
maintain durable ‘products’, organizations and routines that implement the goals of remapping and 
embody the compromises among stakeholders. These institutions vary in their functions, mandates, 
degrees of formality and permanence, and the scales at which they operate.  
The GBR agreement comprises a set of related institutional innovations that collectively 
represent institutional thickening. Institutional thickness is a somewhat ambiguous, elusive 
concept, scarcely refined since North (1990) and Amin and Thrift (1994) identified institutional 
thickness as a key contributor to virtuous cycles of innovation observed in some specialized 
industries. The term evokes the new forms of governance and power topographies that underlie 
contemporary forestry, but it is not inevitable that remaps generate desirable local development. 
Rather, institutional innovation, thickening and remapping entail uncertainties that are both 
political and epistemological, rooted in the co-evolution of bargaining and learning among new 
and old stakeholders. Such processes are hard to predict, and institutional innovation is inevitably 
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experimental, especially in peripheral regions re-inventing themselves. The engagement of more 
stakeholders in turn implies more diverse views and hopes for the future, with the future itself an 
ambiguous planning period. For the GBR, institutional thickening in support of forestry remapping 
is highly politicized, contesting definitions of resource values and development, while invoking 
experimental forms of governance that raise expectations about stakeholder behaviour and trust.  
The specific goal of this paper is to better understand how the remapping of the GBR is 
working out in practice since the 2006 agreement. That agreement proposed a transition period, 
involving several land use orders for its implementation, and culminating in final legislation in 
February 2016 that now governs forest and environmental management in the region. More 
generally, this paper highlights the relationships between remapping, institutional innovation and 
thickening, not addressed by Weiss et al. (2011), which focus on European situations with well-
established property rights. Indeed, institutional innovation in the GBR is a direct consequence of 
conflict, created as conflict resolution measures. Although there are examples of forest conflict 
worldwide (Gritten et al 2014), including forestry disputes in Finland involving the Sami peoples 
(Lawrence and Raitio 2015) and Chipko resistance in the Himalaya (Guha 2000), the closest 
parallels to the GBR are in ‘Western settler societies’ such as Australia and New Zealand 
(Moorhead and Adam 2014, 486; see also Roche 1990; Russell and Jambrecina 2002). These 
countries experienced the establishment of colonial rule and remapping over large areas where 
aboriginal peoples survive, population densities are low, and public ownership of forests 
predominates. The contemporary remapping of the GBR is unique, and part of wider trends. 
An elaboration of a stakeholder model provides the integrating framework for this analysis. 
The paper first defines key contemporary stakeholders, showing how the emergence of new 
stakeholders is responsible for the institutional thickening in the Great Bear Rainforest. This 
remapping is contextualized within previous remappings that have occurred over the last 200 years 
in North American forestry. We suggest that these periodic remappings of forestry practices are 
integral components of broader paradigmatic, Schumpeterian creative-destructive transformations 
in capitalist economies associated with the green techno-economic paradigm, sustainability 
transitions, and related models (Coenen et al 2012). Empirically, the second part of the paper draws 
on wide-ranging information sources including interviews during 2015, and categorizes 
stakeholder interactions on a bilateral basis as institutional innovations and assesses their 
implementation in the 2006–2015 transition period.  
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2. Stakeholders, remapping and innovation 
Stakeholders are interest groups or institutions that influence or are affected by decision 
situations. In any particular situation, stakeholder interests in decision outcomes may not be 
matched by their influence.  Indeed, a basic motivation for remapping forests is to empower 
stakeholders formerly marginalized in decision-making. Such empowerment, which 
simultaneously imposes constraints on vested interests, can itself be seen as an institutional 
innovation that democratizes decision situations.  In general, stakeholder models are analytically 
useful by revealing the basis for defining stakeholders and their relative powers, interests, and 
motivations, and how stakeholders interact in conflict, cooperation and governance. The 
identification of stakeholders is not straightforward: in practical situations the inclusion of too 
many interested parties – a situation that arose in the first phase of the GBR negotiations (McGee 
et al 2010, 751) – can render decision-making ineffective. Parsimony is required in stakeholder 
designation, practically as well as conceptually, and stakeholder models necessarily will vary 
across the diversity of resource peripheries and conflicts. 
A four-legged-plus stakeholder model, based on government, business, community and 
ENGO designations for the BC context, provides the conceptual framework for this analysis 
(Figure 2). The ‘plus’ refers to the courts as an entity within but distinct from government, and to 
First Nations as distinct communities within forest peripheries. This model also recognizes that 
stakeholders at multiple scales are connected by learning and bargaining processes. These 
stakeholder categories are not homogenous or monolithic, and alternative categories are possible. 
Labour as an institution is noted but not highlighted, reflecting its diminishing power to shape 
remapping, and placed in the business category because of overlapping economic goals. In BC, 
prior to 1980 and the onset of contemporary remapping processes, the dominant stakeholder 
interests were the provincial government and big business, with support from union labour. First 
Nations, ENGOs and the courts were not influential, and forestry science was dedicated to the 
industrial values of wood (Rajala 1998). With remapping, however, this simple, hierarchical model 
has become more messy and democratic. 
First, national and regional governments (in federal jurisdictions) have pre-eminent roles 
in establishing the rules of the game – that is, the institutions, policies and regulations that shape 
resource valuation and exploitation (Howlett et al 2009). In Canada, provincial governments have 
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enjoyed pre-eminent responsibilities for resource policies and have generally retained resources in 
public ownership while licensing private sector development rights. Indeed, around the world, 
forests were valued as industrial inputs with governments favouring economic development based 
on large-scale export-driven investments, stimulated by guaranteeing forestry corporations access 
to timber supplies, providing roads, railways, energy and even new towns, encouraging forestry 
science to meet industrial needs, and through the establishment of favourable regulations (Westoby 
1989). BC’s forest policy provides a paradigmatic example (Prudham 2007). 
However, in recent decades governments have been challenged to give more priority to the 
non-industrial benefits of forests (Westoby 1989), notably in relation to conservation values and 
aboriginal rights. Indeed, the courts, with the power to compel government action, have been vital 
to the empowerment of Aboriginal Peoples in Australia (Moorhead and Adams 2013) and Canada 
(Low and Shaw 2011/12) in ways that redefine resource property rights. In a series of decisions 
since 1997, however, the Supreme Court of Canada has “revolutionized the jurisprudence of 
aboriginal rights and title” (Flanagan 2015, iii) – itself labelled a ‘remapping’ by one legal 
authority (op cit, 1) – by rejecting the claim that aboriginal title had been extinguished, and by  
 
Figure 2: A four-legged plus stakeholder model 
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establishing the government’s ‘duty to consult’ wherever claims of aboriginal rights or title are 
pending. In other provinces, treaties governing aboriginal rights and title were signed with many 
indigenous groups, but in BC few treaties were signed and more than 200 First Nations assert 
claims of aboriginal title, often overlapping, and covering most of the province. These court 
decisions established the basis for much stronger involvement by indigenous peoples in resource 
development (Borrows 2002), while potentially raising transaction costs for business decision-
making. 
Second, resource firms, especially large vertically and horizontally integrated corporations, 
have traditionally been the most significant vested interest exploiting forest peripheries. Even 
where pioneering small-scale enterprises have been historically important, the forest sector has 
witnessed significant integration tendencies.  Moreover, the strategies of forest product 
corporations have been conservative and path-dependent, constrained by the need to modernize 
capital-intensive stages of production to remain competitive with rival oligopolists and by the 
specialized nature of managerial expertise and workforces (Edenhoffer and Hayter 2013a).  For 
forest product corporations committed to commodity production, remapping has profound 
implications regarding resource access. In peripheries in the late stages of the resource cycle, these 
implications add to the uncertainties of corporate restructuring driven by technological change, 
increasing costs, declining competitiveness, recessionary conditions and even climate change. In 
BC’s case, job losses, plant closures and divestments by foreign corporations in commodity 
production have been partly offset by an expanding population of smaller firms involved in 
secondary (‘value-added’) processing, along with a Canadianization of the sector (Edenhoffer and 
Hayter 2013b).  The value-added firms, however, have mainly located in metropolitan BC. 
Elsewhere, if surviving commodity mills remain important to local employment, remote forest 
communities have experienced decline.   
Third, small, specialized forest resource communities typically evolved in close tandem 
with the needs and fortune of industry and dominant employers, ties especially evident in company 
(and union) towns that proliferate in many resource peripheries, such as BC or western Australia 
(Argent 2013; Markey et al 2012). In more prosperous times, resource communities and dominant 
resource firms expressed little interest in diversification, but such attitudes are threatened by 
corporate restructuring and remapping. Indeed, when resource industries have downsized, 
especially if new residents immigrate for economic or lifestyle reasons, communities have become 
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both more independent and interested in diversification (Brown 1995). In general, resource 
restructuring at least softens, if not fractures, community and worker support for vested industrial 
interests, often in association with more sympathy for environmental sustainability.  
Moreover, aboriginal empowerment is in turn challenging traditional interpretations of the 
roles and composition of resource communities.  In the Canadian literature on resource towns, 
stimulated by Lucas (1971), aboriginal populations, whether on reserves or in the towns 
themselves, are presented as marginalized, dis-empowered populations with no influence in local 
planning and economy.  Recently, however, aboriginal peoples have generated their own 
community plans for development on long established and newly acquired lands. First Nations 
have become increasingly involved in BC’s forest industries, and by 2010 controlled more than 
10% of the provincial harvest volume (BC 2010), up from 5% in 2006. Many of the new 
community forests in BC are controlled by aboriginal peoples, or they have formal roles in 
governance (McIlveen and Bradshaw 2009).  
ENGOs comprise our fourth stakeholder group. Stimulating and responding to broad public 
concerns, the environmental movement has provided powerful advocacy of the non-industrial 
values of forests (and other resources) since the 1960s and especially since 1980. Significantly, 
the environmental movement has been important to reinforcing a strong social sense that ‘nature’ 
is a public inheritance that provides multiple benefits and associated public responsibilities to 
ensure their sustainability. In the USA, for example, the recently (2014) deceased Joseph L. Sax 
led arguments to vindicate the legal claim that vital natural resources such as oceans, shorelines, 
air and some land, were a ‘public trust’ and needed to be conserved. Since 1970 this public trust 
doctrine, first adopted in Michigan, has spread throughout the US, and many countries beyond, 
and helped fuel a rapidly growing environmental movement opposed to large-scale resource 
commodification. For resources that remain under public control, the right to protest is particularly 
profound, and readily legitimized.  
ENGOs have been a powerful presence in forest conflicts around the world as they seek to 
modify or stop environmentally damaging logging and preserve the ecological values of old 
growth forests. Some ENGOs, such as Greenpeace which originated in BC, are international in 
scope. However, ENGO activities are not about ‘asset building’ or ‘market share’ but through 
advocacy and communication seek to influence public opinion and ultimately public resource 
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policies.  ENGOs are media savvy and employ tactics ranging from political and consumer 
lobbying, logging blockades, shaming perceived environmental culprits, participation in 
committees at every scale of decision-making, coalition building, and promoting ecological 
science. ENGOs vary in motives and tactics, but collectively they push governments to introduce 
policies that sustain environmental values.  In BC, ENGOs have been a leading force in protesting 
forest commodity production, especially in relation to old growth temperate forests in coastal 
regions.  After a decade of protest, they helped engineer an important agreement in 1993 promoting 
conservation of forests in Clayoquot Sound on Vancouver Island, which subsequently became a 
UNESCO biosphere reserve and world heritage site in 2000. ENGOs then shifted their attention 
north to the Great Bear Rainforest, an evocative and provocative name suggested by 
environmentalists (McAllister et al 1997). 
The shift towards a more democratic stakeholder model with new actors in forest conflicts 
implies more complex local-global dynamics. Sometimes in tandem and sometimes not, both 
ENGOs and indigenous peoples have sought to build alliances locally and globally, as they seek 
to influence public opinion, consumers, and governments within BC and elsewhere.  In Canada 
both ENGO and aboriginal opposition to vested forest interests have been reinforced by the 
ongoing trade dispute between Canada and the US over lumber exports (Edenhoffer and Hayter 
2013a). Thus US interests represented by the Coalition of Fair Canadian Lumber Imports (CFCLI) 
have argued that Canadian (especially BC) lumber exports are unfairly subsidized and have sought 
to restrict those exports since the 1980s.  The CFCLI has become a watchdog or shadow 
stakeholder over BC forest policy, vigilant to any perceived Canadian violation. Over 30 years, 
the CFCLI, ENGOs and First Nations have often found common cause. Forest resource 
management, once considered a matter of provincial autonomy, has increasingly come under 
global scrutiny. 
Forest conflicts are deep-seated and difficult to resolve for various reasons. The conflicts 
are normative, reflecting different beliefs about natural resource values. While industrial uses have 
dominated forest management, the ecosystem services, biocentric values and cultural significance 
of the forest are given priority by ENGOs and aboriginal peoples. Further, many non-wood 
benefits are intangible or non-economic and cannot be incorporated in quantitative trade-offs that 
underlie cost-benefit or multiple-use approaches. Remapping proponents have become skilled in 
opposing vested industrial interests, and organizing effective, powerful alliances. Moreover, if 
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remapping proponents have shared interests in opposing industry, they do not necessarily share 
the same aims, priorities or solutions (Hayter 2003).  
2.1 Forestry remapping and paradigm change  
Forestry remappings have occurred before as part of broader ‘paradigmatic’ restructurings 
of economy and society driven by technological and institutional innovations (Freeman and Louça 
2001). The link to techno-economic paradigms helps illuminate the path-dependent challenge of 
contemporary remapping, the role of innovation and the stimulus of crisis. Drawing from western 
settler and especially North American experience, three broad forestry remappings can be 
identified in relation to broader paradigm shifts (Franklin et al 1997; Hayes and Glendenning 2005).  
First, an era of deforestation (1850-1910) was part of large-scale 19th century industrialization. A 
second remapping promoted a regulated ‘scientific’ forestry (1915-1970), a quintessential example 
of the Fordist paradigm. Since 1970, in a period variously referred to as post-Fordism, the era of 
flexibility, or globalization, forestry is being transformed by the principles of ecosystem 
management, with the hope that forestry will become part of a sustainable transition or green 
paradigm. These three periods of remapping respectively involved: colonization, dispossession 
and deforestation; sustained yield and silvicultural forest management over large estates, privately 
owned or leased from the state; and adaptive forest management with multiple goals, with stronger 
commitments to conservation and community ownership. In broad terms, modern forestry evolved 
as a handmaiden to industry that became formalized as top-down, technocratically regulated 
‘scientific’ practices that are now being challenged by concerns for more diverse values. If this 
scenario is found in North American and western settler societies, it resonates elsewhere, such as 
in the Himalaya (Guha 2000).   
A key part of the present paradigm shift, deeply implicated in forest conflicts, is the debate 
over scientific wisdom in forestry practices (Langston 2005; Rajala 1998). Thus modern forestry 
science and practices were developed in Europe, mainly Germany, and became similarly 
institutionalized in the North American forestry profession whose ‘rational’ advice “imposed a 
rational, uniform and simplistic order on the complexities of localized ecological systems” (Lee 
and Field 2005, 3). For Langston, this advice became an intellectually authoritarian framework 
that defined sustained yield and silviculture according to industry’s needs. This thinking, for 
example, equated old growth forests, that is forests in which productivity gains and losses offset 
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each other, with decadent timber, increasingly worthless to industry. Indeed, as recently as 1986 a 
leading forest economist labelled BC’s remaining old growth forests in exactly this way (Percy 
1986). In this view, old growth forests should be logged as fast as possible and replaced by newer, 
more productive forests, commonly in single-species single-aged stands. Community benefits and 
healthy forests were consequences assumed to flow from this rational management system. 
However, as Langston (2005) shows, conventional forest science orthodoxy often failed in 
its own terms. Changing the species mix led to more damage by disease and insects, and increased 
vulnerability to fire; even-aged clear-cutting led to similar problems and conflicted with other 
users; and mills were promised optimistic timber allocations, making mill closures inevitable. 
Meanwhile the ecological values of old-growth forests were ignored. For proponents of remapping, 
however, these values are central, and were underlined by alternative research and forms of 
knowledge not mandated to grow trees solely for wood production. For Langston (2005, 72) forest 
conflicts in Oregon stimulated the various stakeholders to engage in understanding each other’s 
perspectives: “What mattered most about litigation was that it forces a variety of stakeholders, 
with multiple voices, multiple stories, and multiple perspectives to communicate with each other”.  
Co-evolution of bargaining and learning is not straightforward. Thus the critics of 
conventional forestry practices not only point to alternative scientific evidence but emphasize local 
variations in ecological processes and that the scientific understanding of dynamic ecosystems is 
constantly changing, never complete.  Drawing on Firey’s (2005, originally 1963) insights, this 
debate is rooted in future expectations that are judgmental, varied and constrained: remapping 
requires agreement over the stable institutionalization of future-referring values that are “space 
and time-bound: they are tied to particular social orders whose eventual demise they are destined 
to share” (idem, 27). Within these bounds, remapping depends on stakeholders establishing mutual 
trust over recognizing multiple values, a shared willingness to sacrifice some present for future 
values, and shared sense of obligation to local territory. There are no mechanical formulas to 
achieve such cooperative behaviour.  
Stakeholder-driven remapping stresses the need to make policy choices based on a 
diversity of scientific arguments and knowledge; in Weiss’ (2011) terms, innovations that change 
the political-institutional framework of forestry are required. Innovation is conventionally divided 
in a business context into product, process, marketing, and organizational innovations, varying 
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from incremental to radical. However, Weiss argues that institutional innovations that are hard or 
impossible for market actors to initiate are important in forestry and relate to changes in procedures, 
regulations or incentives or joint actions by public or semi-public organizations. Further, in 
stakeholder models, innovation implies inter-organizational cooperation that may be horizontal or 
vertical and “may be seen both as an innovation itself (a new organizational model) and as a 
supporting factor for innovations (e.g. information exchange in sector meetings or maintaining 
cross-sectoral relations)” (Weiss 2011, 15).  
Such supporting process innovations are particularly significant in forest conflict situations 
as a condition for achieving cooperation over integrating disparate knowledge bases and 
epistemologies among stakeholders prior to negotiated agreement(s). As we note below, a 
scientific boundary organization illustrates such an innovation that has been key to the GBR 
negotiations. The hope is to create durable institutions to organize resource governance. 
Admittedly, the distinction between facilitative (supporting or process) and outcome (product) 
institutional innovations can be blurred, especially in light of their experimental nature.  However, 
this messiness underlines the need to analyze related innovations that comprise institutional 
thickening. 
3. Stakeholder collaboration and institutional innovation in the Great Bear Rainforest  
The second half of this paper explores to what extent the institutional thickening produced 
by the GBR remapping can generate a virtuous circle of innovation. The four legged-plus 
stakeholder model generates six possible bilateral avenues for conflict resolution and the 
development of co-operation (Figure 3). This schema represents the initiatives, practices and 
organizations that have unfolded since 2006. While these interactions are represented as bilateral 
because they were generated initially to solve bilateral conflicts, they occur within a multi-
stakeholder dynamic and an environmental governance model in which collaboration, or at least 
acquiescence, of all parties is necessary to validate and implement agreements. These new 
institutions include a firm, a foundation, an alliance, a protocol, and a set of management practices. 
They also include changes to existing institutions, such as those regulating forest tenure and 
logging practices, significant financial investment in conservation and development projects and 
aboriginal capacities to monitor, conserve and develop resources in their traditional territories. 
Collectively they reflect significant institutional thickening.  
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Figure 3: Institutional thickening in the Great Bear Rainforest 
The empirical analysis draws on research conducted over the past 15 years on the GBR, 
including interviews, participant observation, literature review and geospatial analysis.  Earlier 
research focused on understanding the origins of the conflict, the nature of bargaining, and hopes 
for remapping. This paper shifts attention to outcomes, and derives from new research, featuring 
ten interviews conducted in the summer of 2015 with ENGO representatives, civil servants, forest 
industry consultants and aboriginal representatives with long experience in GBR negotiations, and 
who remain directly involved in outcomes. Our questions were open-ended but focused on how 
aspects of GBR plans and agreement are working out in practice. Indeed, the collective 
understanding and interactions of our 2015 respondents are a significant part of the social capital 
and institutional thickness on which regional development will depend going forward. As prelude 
to the six bilateral relationships, the key facilitative or supportive innovation is briefly referenced. 
3.1 Facilitating the GBR agreement: the Coast Information Team 
A scientific boundary organization, the Coast Information Team (CIT), was a key 
facilitative development for the GBR agreement, established to separate disputes over science from 
interest-based negotiations (Clapp and Mortenson 2011). The CIT’s mandate was to establish a 
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common knowledge base on which all stakeholders agreed, to answer questions posed by 
negotiators, and to support the bargaining process (Affolderbach et al 2012). The shared 
knowledge base generated through this process was a GIS of the region that mapped multiple 
cultural, economic and ecological characteristics. The CIT itself emerged as a compromise in 2001 
after lengthy and often heated interactions among the stakeholders during the regional planning 
process initiated by the provincial government in the 1990s. That is, institutional thickening 
occurred as a precondition to agreement. 
In turn the CIT provided the foundation for the GBR agreement of 2006 that identified 
extensive new protected areas, established land use zoning at multiple scales, and committed to 
ecosystem based management throughout the forest matrix. The CIT has since been disbanded, 
but its work outputs, notably the ecological spatial analysis, have been essential for the 
development of ecosystem based management discussed below in section 3.4. The same 
negotiations also generated more permanent institutions, notably an agreement establishing the 
Coast Opportunity Funds (section 3.5) with public and philanthropic capital to support 
conservation-based development. In general terms, this agreement illustrates the paradigmatic 
changes from government to governance as they occur in forestry decision-making, and its shift 
from a top-down model to a more democratic model in which state and big business powers are 
diluted and new social forces are recognized as stakeholders. This example illustrates the role of 
conflict in stimulating the innovations underlying paradigm change. We argue that without the 
intense forestry conflicts that exploded in BC in the 1980s and 1990s, such a remapping agreement 
could not have happened. Vested interests would have had no incentive to change behaviour, and 
public consciousness located in distant metropoles would scarcely have noticed. Such a view 
echoes the claim by Lee (1984) that sustained yield principles were developed in Germany in the 
19th century, not out of extant cooperative behaviour as commonly supposed, but to resolve highly 
problematic, unstable situations. 
However, the relationships between institutional innovation, institutional thickness and 
conflict are problematical. Conflict and protest may stiffen the opposition from vested interests, 
place-based targeting by interest groups may lead to unintended consequences elsewhere, 
antagonism may delay compromise, business may prefer to invest elsewhere, and the energies used 
in protest and conflict resolution may be exhausted, no longer available for constructive 
engagement. Moreover, remapping agreements are plans that need to be implemented; plans may 
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or may not be executed. Indeed, a key question for remapping agreements that are derived from 
high levels of mistrust and conflict is whether they have actually become institutionalized, that is 
become the basis for durable, stable behaviour. The construction and maintenance of social capital 
is not a guaranteed consequence of institutional thickening.  
3.2 Business and ENGOs: the Joint Solutions Project 
Collaboration between industrial and environmental interests has erected a new framework 
of institutions to implement ‘socially responsible’ ideas of self-regulation without direct 
government intervention. Among these institutions are at least three types of firms: value-added 
processors, third-party verifiers, and multi-national retailers who market and demand certified 
wood products (e.g., IKEA, Home Depot and others). More important for the Great Bear 
Rainforest agreement, however, was a bilateral collaboration that emerged during multilateral 
negotiations in the summer of 2000.  
To break the impasse created by continued logging and the market campaigns, four forest 
companies (Interfor, NorskeCanada, Western Forest Products and Weyerhaeuser) began 
negotiations with four ENGOs (Forest Ethics, Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network, and the 
Sierra Club), leading to a suspension of market campaigns against the companies in return for a 
moratorium on logging in 30 watersheds critical for conservation. The resulting alliance was 
dubbed the Joint Solutions Project (JSP), and its proposals broke a logjam in negotiations in 2001 
(Mortenson 2005). The bilateral agreement restarted the multi-sector negotiations that would result 
in an interim land use map, the establishment of the Coast Information Team, and commitments 
to apply ecosystem-based management in the coastal forest matrix. The JSP negotiated internal 
agreements over logging practices, protection areas, and development time frames based on 
compromises acceptable to both parties, and eventually other stakeholders as well. 
The JSP continued to play an essential role beyond the initial compromise. The best 
evidence of its influence has been to reach agreement that under ecosystem-based management, 
protection would be set at a precautionary 70% of the range of natural variation within the 
operating land base. This increased forest protection in the Great Bear Rainforest from 50% agreed 
upon in 2009 (Price et al 2009), already a significant increase over the complicated compromise 
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of 2004, which set a 30%-50%-70% sliding scale for protection, depending on the scarcity of the 
ecosystem.  
Interviews with ENGO and industry representatives confirmed that this bilateral 
collaboration continued to facilitate communication and to negotiate compromises reflected in 
memoranda of understanding. The JSP by itself, however, does not demonstrate institutional 
thickening because it was created for negotiations that have been concluded with the formal 2015 
agreement. In the words of an industry consultant, the “JSP has run its course” (Interview 1). 
Institutional thickness that promotes regional development is described in the literature as existing 
in ongoing practices. The JSP helped establish the groundwork for broader collaboration, but like 
the Coast Information Team, may itself cease to exist.  
3.3 British Columbia and First Nations: government-to-government negotiations 
Cooperation and convergence between business and ENGOs reflect voluntary commitment 
and self-regulation within civil society, a phenomenon also evinced by eco-certification bodies 
like the Forest Stewardship Council. Other aspects of institutional thickening are directly related 
to process innovation in formal government, contrasted with broader and more diffuse processes 
of governance. Political and cultural interests have reserved final assent to stakeholder-negotiated 
agreements to the province and First Nations in a subsequent and higher level of government-to-
government (G2G) negotiations.  
G2G negotiations emerged from the initial 2001 stakeholder consensus recommendations 
to government. The notion of a subsequent and higher level of review was important to First 
Nations because it recognized at least the possibility of aboriginal title and shared sovereignty over 
natural resources. G2G negotiation was predicated on an agreement, the Turning Point Initiative, 
that brought the 27 different aboriginal groups with traditional territories in the region to develop 
common conservation, cultural and economic goals and to participate in both provincial and 
federal negotiations with one voice as Coastal First Nations (coastalfirstnations.ca; Davis 2009).  
First Nations’ new influence, including veto power over stakeholder recommendations, 
arose from a series of decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada establishing the existence, 
parameters and obligations of aboriginal title, beginning in 1997 with Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia. The decision confirmed that aboriginal title had not been extinguished in BC, and that 
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the Crown was obliged to consult and accommodate First Nations. While G2G had been mooted 
in the early 1990s, the Delgamuukw decision and Great Bear Rainforest negotiations marked the 
shift of G2G negotiations from an ill-defined concept to a functioning institutional structure, as 
well as the “shift in the role of First Nations: from a particular kind of ‘stakeholder’ to a long-term 
government partner.” (Barry 2012, 217) 
G2G negotiations represent both an advance and a complication of aboriginal relations 
within BC. It is a victory for First Nations because it formally recognizes their right to be consulted 
not merely as stakeholders but as potentially a quasi-sovereign government with unextinguished 
aboriginal title. For the province, it constitutes a rapprochement in a long and largely fruitless 
process of treaty negotiations. First Nations now exert control over where and how much logging 
can take place, but the limitations of G2G negotiations are keenly felt: the protocol allows for First 
Nations review of and consent to logging operations, but not pipelines, fish farms or grizzly bear 
hunting (Interview 2; Interview 8). Several respondents independently characterized the province’s 
approach to G2G as one of ‘containment’, resisting attempts to extend the model elsewhere in the 
province. 
3.4 Government and ENGOs: ecosystem-based management 
Government and ENGOs have found productive, if conflictual, engagement in defining 
ecosystem-based management (EBM) for the GBR. EBM emerged as a vital component of the 
compromises that began in the Joint Solutions Project. EBM was essential to the 2001 interim 
agreement because it assured ENGOs that ecosystem function would be better maintained than in 
conventional forestry by extending ecological priorities beyond protected areas to the entire forest 
matrix. EBM was approved by the province and First Nations in G2G negotiations, and now guide 
the management of the forest matrix outside the new protected areas. Nevertheless, reaching 
agreement on the definition and implementation of EBM has taken more than a decade of 
painstaking analysis and negotiation (Interview 4).  
EBM sets goals and objectives at multiple scales: at the sub-region or territory (500,000–
5,000,000 hectares), the landscape (30,000–100,000 ha), the watershed (1000–50,000 ha) and the 
site (under 250 ha). To measure these objectives for different ecosystem types under varying 
scenarios of logging pattern and intensity, EBM is constructed using an Ecosystem Spatial 
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Analysis generated to inform the stakeholders at the negotiation table. The spatial analysis is a 
shared-source database in which all stakeholders’ technical specialists agreed to the co-ordinate 
system. It provided a detailed mapping of ecosystems and enabled their characterization by 
regional rarity as well as their economic accessibility and timber volumes (Clapp and Mortenson 
2011).  
Setting protection targets depends on a body of science sufficient to determine for each 
constituent ecosystem within the region a ‘range of natural variability’, defined as the range of 
dynamic change in natural systems over historic time periods (Allen 2005). The Ecological Spatial 
Analysis was essential to the GBR agreement: it allowed delicate compromises to be worked out 
with confidence that they could ultimately be implemented. For example, in the 2003 agreement, 
the stakeholders agreed on a target for old-growth forest retention at the landscape level of “50 
percent of the natural proportion, provided the average across all landscapes is 70 percent (the sub-
regional target); and at the watershed level 30 percent, provided the average across all watersheds 
is 50 percent (the landscape level target).” (Allen 2005, 11).  
The final protection level proposed by the JSP in 2014 and legislated by the province in 
February 2016 was a more straightforward 70% of the range of natural variability. The JSP 
commissioned a literature review and meta-analysis of 20 cases of ecosystem resilience or collapse 
(Price et al 2007). Ecological risk was theorized as the area of habitat loss relative to a range of 
natural variation. More than 60% remaining intact of the natural benchmark projected low risk to 
biodiversity, while below 30% of the benchmark risk the onset of rapid decline with effects 
cascading through multiple species and the food chain generally (Interview 2). The science was 
enough for a negotiated outcome: the JSP ultimately agreed that ecosystem-based management 
should mean protecting a precautionary 70% of the matrix, which one industry consultant 
characterized as leaving only 15% of the productive area available for harvesting (Interview 1).  
Although EBM is an ongoing government function, its key parameters have largely been 
set by business and ENGOs. The province is wary of establishing EBM as a precedent for other 
regions, regarding it as research-intensive (Interview 2), expensive (Interview 3) and impinging 
on provincial sovereignty (Interview 4). Several respondents characterized government policy on 
both EBM and G2G negotiations as ‘containment’ –concessions necessary to achieve peace in the 
Great Bear Rainforest, but not models for the rest of the province. Stakeholder processes begin 
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government delegating some of its powers, and First Nations and ENGOs have gained substantial 
influence at the cost of governmental discretion and autonomy. The province seems determined to 
avoid extending a GBR model of G2G negotiations and ecosystem-based management. 
3.5 First Nations and ENGOs: the Coast Opportunity Funds  
Community and environmental collaborations are reflected in informal, occasionally 
uneasy, alliances during the land-use zoning negotiations. Informal alliances may not lead to 
permanent institutions but nevertheless affect negotiations at critical junctures, and are key 
elements of social capital. Whether those informal collaborations continue in the absence of a 
formal institution charged with promoting them is an important question, but empirically difficult 
to answer. At least one aspect of those collaborations has been formalized in the Coast Opportunity 
Funds. 
One of the key compromises in the GBR agreement was the contribution of capital to fund 
conservation-based development proposals. A frequent challenge from communities and First 
Nations to ENGOs during the negotiations was to “put their money where their mouths are”, 
calling on environmentalists to find resources to make up for the logging jobs that would be lost 
in any reduction to sustainable levels (Mortenson 2005). The Coast Opportunity Funds were 
established in partnership between BC, Canada and private donors, notably the international 
foundations that were instrumental in funding the ENGO market campaigns, among them the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Hewlett Foundation, the Packard Foundation, and the Pew 
Charitable Trusts (Tedesco 2015). Of the Funds’ CAD 120 million in initial funding, half came 
from the foundations, and the other half from the provincial and federal governments (Davis 2009). 
The Great Bear Rainforest is widely agreed to be of global conservation significance; the Coast 
Opportunity Funds muster global resources to fund its conservation. An industry observer 
commented that it was nice to see the foundations supporting local capacity instead of market 
campaigns (Interview 1). 
The Coast Opportunity Funds comprise two separate funds: the Conservation Fund 
supports participating First Nations by funding projects to ensure the ecological integrity of the 
GBR, such as ecological research; habitat protection, restoration and enhancement; and capacity-
building for resource planning, management and monitoring. The Conservation Fund is a 
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permanent endowment of CAD 56 million, with annual expenditures of approximately CAD 2 
million (Coast Opportunity Funds 2015). Perhaps the most significant achievements of the 
Conservation Fund have been the establishment of integrated stewardship offices for many 
participating First Nations (Interview 7), enabling them to decide which and what kind of 
development proposals they wish to allow. Prior to 2007, some First Nations had fisheries 
departments. Five years later most had broadened their focus to include forestry and ecotourism 
proposals consistent with the conservation aims of the GBR agreement. Some First Nations 
resource management offices now review companies’ logging plans before they are submitted to 
the province, achieving the objectives of both business and community more efficiently. 
Equally significant are the newly created Guardian Watchmen programs. Based on the 
model of the Haida Watchmen Program, formed in 1993 to monitor fisheries and cultural heritage 
sites in the islands of Haida Gwaii, Coastal First Nations have promoted a network of similar 
organizations for the central and north coasts. Monitoring is an ongoing cost of environmental 
planning, one that is often de-funded when government cut costs. Support from the Coast 
Opportunity Funds has enabled First Nations to establish their own monitoring programs, and 
helped to leverage additional funding from other philanthropic foundations (Interview 7). 
In contrast to the permanent endowment of the Conservation Fund, the Economic 
Development Fund of CAD 58 million is to be spent in its entirely by 2017 to support sustainable 
businesses and community-based jobs in the region (Coast Opportunity Funds 2015). The 
economic development funds are allocated (in confidential discussions) to First Nations in varying 
proportions, with larger shares of the funding allocated to First Nations whose traditional territories 
contained larger shares of the newly established conservancies (Interview 7). The Coast 
Opportunity Funds have been instrumental in establishing new institutions and capacity within the 
First Nations, building up institutional thickness at the regional and territorial level, with ongoing 
support that promises to survive beyond the conclusion of the negotiations.   
3.6 First Nations and Business: Coast Tsimshian Resources 
Some further evidence of institutional thickening is seen in the growing connections 
between industrial and aboriginal interests. At least ten First Nations in the GBR have signed 
revenue-sharing agreements with forest companies operating in their traditional territories 
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(Hoekstra and Pynn 2015), although the amount and proportion of revenue shared remains 
confidential. Perhaps more significant is the emergence of First Nations-owned companies. The 
most prominent example is Coast Tsimshian Resources, which acquired the forest tenures of the 
bankrupt Skeena Cellulose in 2007, with long-term annual harvesting rights of 564,314 cubic 
meters (Hoekstra and Pynn 2015). Coast Tsimshian Resources employs 110 workers, maintains a 
marketing office in Shanghai and has pioneered the export of hemlock logs from the north and 
central coasts to China, Japan and Korea.  
Aboriginal ownership or consent is requisite to eco-certification by the Forest Stewardship 
Council, which includes assurance of indigenous peoples’ consultation, accommodation and 
participation. This innovation is important for expanding use of coastal western hemlock (Tsuga 
heterophylla, also known as green hemlock), a lower-quality but still abundant resource that has 
lacked markets, evincing the expanding participation of First Nations in the forest industry.  
3.7 Government and Business: forest tenure, community forests and conservancies 
Reform of the longstanding political-industrial alliance between big business and the 
provincial government can be seen in the retrenchment of forest tenure arrangements, including 
the expansion of log auctions, the clawback of forest tenures and the creation of new community 
forests. These are not necessarily institutional innovations: they may better be described as new 
priorities expressed through existing institutions, such as when the Chief Forester reduced the 
Annual Allowable Cut for the Mid Coast Timber Supply Area to 767,000 cubic meters in 2011 to 
reflect the withdrawal of new conservancies from the working forest (Ministry of Forests, Lands 
and Natural Resource Operations 2011). Nevertheless, the GBR has seen the expansion of the 
community forest model pioneered in developing countries (Porter-Bolland et al 2014) and 
adopted elsewhere in BC (McIlveen and Bradshaw 2009). The Nuxalk Forestry Partnership, an 
aboriginally owned firm, and the Bella Coola Community Forest, established in the township of 
Bella Coola, operated independently for over five years, but have recently come together to 
increase the scale of their operations (Thompson 2014). 
A final institutional innovation reflecting ongoing collaboration between government and 
business can be seen in the conservancies, a new category of protected areas created in the Great 
Bear Rainforest (Stronghill et al 2015). Conservancies limit logging, hydro-electric development 
 23 
and other large-scale industrial developments, but allow exceptions for aboriginal commercial 
activities, as well as subsistence and ceremonial activities. While logging is restricted, fishing, 
aquaculture, guiding, filming, log salvage and the harvest of non-timber forest products are 
included in various conservancy management plans (Stronghill et al 2015). To keep a campaign 
promise made to the mining industry, the provincial government insisted that new protected areas 
should not place geologically prospective areas off limits to mineral exploration and development. 
The conservancies are to be co-managed by First Nations and the province. 
4. Conclusion: institutional innovation and paradigm change 
The GBR has moved from government to governance, in which the role of the state is 
diffused and dispersed among multiple stakeholders. The most significant change in the new power 
topography is the provincial state, which has obtained peace in the woods at the cost of significant 
autonomy over resource allocation, conservation and management. Stakeholder negotiation tables 
generated the agreements for the province’s ratification. Under the terms of G2G negotiations, 
ratification was shared with First Nations. 
Of the six bilateral interactions in the four-legged-plus stakeholder model, most resulted in 
rapprochement or compromise, the removal of obstacles to industrial operations, and the expansion 
of community control. Each had elements of novelty and local adaptation, while drawing on 
precedents and models from other resource peripheries. If aboriginally owned firms, bilateral 
alliances, community forests, conservation foundations, ecosystem-based management and G2G 
negotiations have precedents elsewhere, they collectively represent institutional thickening in 
many dimensions on an unprecedented scale in this thinly populated region. Changes to forest 
tenure in the context of remapping environmental and cultural values also represent a significant 
shift of stakeholder power, supporting the characterization of a new paradigm in forestry. The 
outcome of this remapping process is neither a free market solution, nor public control, but an 
increasingly complex architecture of institutions, based in both civil society and the state, that 
promote sustainability, resilience and legitimacy. 
This paper has argued that regional development is structured by institutions constructed 
and thickened during conflict resolution. New or modified institutions are needed to implement 
stakeholder compromises. Process innovation facilitates bargaining, drives learning and secures 
the social license to operate. Despite the emergence of a new paradigm, the development of shared 
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norms, values and behaviors is not an automatic consequence of new maps and formal agreements: 
the efficacy and the survival of each of these institutions remain uncertain and contingent on 
follow-through, goodwill and the transfer to productive engagement of the social network 
constructed during negotiations. Government-to-government negotiations are a process innovation 
in the BC context, but how or even whether they will continue in the GBR or elsewhere in the 
province remains unclear.  
Furthermore, process innovation in remapping is as much associated with satisfying 
gatekeeping conditions and securing the social license to produce, as with increasing productivity 
or profitability. Innovation in the context of a new paradigm in contested resource peripheries is 
far removed from the notion of science as handmaiden to industry. Many of the new collaborations 
and alliances have been generated by the need to seek public legitimacy because survival rather 
than increased efficiency was at stake. This poses a challenge to the teleological spirit of regional 
development theory: how can we tell if institutional thickening constitutes a positive development, 
especially where process innovation is concerned? This case study has demonstrated substantial 
institutional thickening, but not necessarily a virtuous circle of innovation along the lines theorized 
by North (1990), Amin and Thrift (1994) and others. Whether these new institutions reflect the 
formation of enduring social capital that promotes regional development, or a sclerotic hyper-
regulation that hinders it, requires further research. 
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